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EXPORTING ENVIRONMENTALISM:
THOUGHTS ON THE USE OF MARKET POWER
TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
"FREE TRADE" ERA
Joshua R. Floum*
Preservation and remediation of the global environment
raises transnational concerns. Treaty organizations and multilateral agreements, however, rarely take sufficient steps to
redress these concerns. Recent debates over ratification of
the NAFTA 1 and GATT 2 treaties have focused attention on
the alternative use of domestic market power to influence the
environmental behavior of developing nations. Unilateral domestic measures such as embargoes, punitive tariffs and
other trade measures conditioned on environmental performance have proven very effective. For example, court-ordered
U.S. trade embargoes directly led to the virtual demise of the
purse-seine tuna/dolphin fishery, saving hundreds of
thousands of dolphins. Developed nations utilizing such
measures, however, have been charged with economic demagoguery and "environmental imperialism."
TRADE v. THE ENVIRONMENT

Now free trade advocates in the developed world also
have begun to weigh-in in opposition to unilateral trade
measures designed to preserve the environment. Since the
use of trade restrictions runs counter to purist free-trade ideals, some believe that the ratification of NAFTA and the recent ratification of the Uruguay Round amendments to GATT
* Mr. Floum is a litigation Partner in San Francisco's Heller, Ehrman,
White & McAuliffe, where he specializes in intellectual property, antitrust and
transnational trade issues. He is plaintiffs' lead counsel in the tuna/dolphin
(EarthIsland Institute v. Mosbacher,N.D. California) and the shrimp/sea turtle
litigation (Earth Island Institute v. Christopher,Court of International Trade).
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605
(1993).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
(1994).
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portends the demise of unilateral trade measures designed to
preserve the environment.
Recently, a GATT panel was asked to resolve a dispute
between the European Community and the United States
over provisions in the United States' Marine Mammal Protection Act which conditioned imports of yellowfin tuna on the
use of fishing methods designed to save dolphins. Article XX
paragraphs (d) and (g) of the GATT allow exceptions to the
treaty's general proscription against non-tariff trade barriers
where "necessary to protect animal life or health" or where
"related to the conservation of natural resources."3 The
GATT panel recognized that the U.S. policy of protecting dolphins fell within these exceptions.
The panel emphasized, however, that the embargoes
themselves would not save dolphins; dolphins would only be
saved from drowning in tuna nets if the tuna embargoes
"forced" the exporting nations to catch tuna using dolphinsafe techniques. In a wholly conclusory advisory opinion, the
panel found that the United States could not implement unilateral conservation measures whose success depended on
"forc[ing] other contracting parties to change their policies
within their jurisdiction."4 The panel's decision does not have
the force of GATT authority because it has not been adopted
by the GATT Council-nor would it supersede U.S. law even
if adopted by the council-but it is troubling nonetheless both
for its paucity of analysis (ivory bans won't necessarily save
elephants either), and because NAFTA incorporates by reference GATT's Article XX exceptions.
In a reversal of Bush administration policy, the Clinton
administration has defended the propriety of the tuna embargoes under GATT. The U.S. Trade Representative advanced
arguments indicating an appreciation of the greater significance of integrating environmental concerns into trade regimes. "The United States stated that in becoming contracting parties to [GATT], countries did not agree to
surrender their ability to take effective action to protect the
environment, including the global commons."5
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
(1947).
4. Report of Panel in United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
DS29, para 5.26, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
5. Panel Report, para. 3.10, 33 I.L.M. 839, (1994).
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The relationship between environmental and trade
measures will be considered in the context of preparations for
the formation of the World Trade Organization, which will be
established under the Uruguay Round Amended GATT. During the course of these and other negotiations, environmentalists will argue that the GATT and other multilateral trade
treaties should be "greened." The outcome of these negotiations largely will depend on a proper valuation of the external
costs associated with environmental degradation.
VALUING THE ENVIRONMENT

Proponents of the use of market power to protect the environment point out that economic influence is wholly appropriate as a means to counter environmental "free riding." Assume the example of a Mexican corn producer using harmful
insecticides (or a Great Lakes industrial factory emitting
harmful air pollutants). Each of these companies is free riding in the sense that it does not bear the real costs associated
with the environmental degradation caused by its production
processes. Since the environment is a "global commons," it is
appropriate for the producer to pay these costs (in economic
parlance, to internalize the externalities).
Developing nations will argue that it is unfair to require
from them the same environmental standards as have been
adopted by certain wealthy states. After all, the developed
nations free rode on the environment for years during their
industrial revolutions and only now, from the relative safety
of their current market advantage, do they seek to export
their new-found standards on economies struggling to
achieve equivalent standards of living. In this view, unilateral measures which impose one nation's environmental
standards on another are simply another form of jingoism.
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

The sentiments of the developing nations have a certain
logic and appeal. After all, these countries are playing economic catch-up and, in many cases, have hungry mouths to
feed. Isn't it more prudent to address environmental concerns through multilateral treaty organizations which balance such concerns with the legitimate economic interests of
their constituents? Haven't, for example, the Montreal Protocol on substances which damage the ozone layer, the CITES
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convention on international trade in endangered species 6 and
the Basel Convention on trade in hazardous wastes 7 demonstrated that treaties can be effective?
Even putting aside the formalistic arguments of some
free traders that GATT may trump even these multilateral
treaties, however, the theories of the treaty advocates suffer
from a more fundamental shortcoming. In many circumstances, there simply is not enough time to put environmental reforms on hold while economies achieve parity and production processes naturally evolve.
Take as another example the current controversy over
the drowning of sea turtles in shrimping nets. The United
States' Endangered Species Act prohibits the taking of
shrimp by U.S. vessels and prohibits importation of shrimp
products from countries which have failed to make relatively
minor adjustments in net configurations which allow turtles
to escape from the shrimpers' nets. While, in a perfect world,
a treaty might already have been drafted requiring such adjustments, none exists and no preliminary treaty negotiations loom on the horizon. In the meantime, the population of
species such as the Kemp's Ridley sea turtle has dwindled to
the thousands, and since May 4 hundreds are washing ashore
dead in the Gulf of Mexico after having gone through the
shrimp nets. The prospects for other species such as the tiger
are equally as dire. For the species which once flourished in
the Black Sea and in most of East Europe's major rivers, it is
already too late.
If one properly views the environment, in the words of
the U.S. trade representative, as a "global commons," it is incumbent upon each nation to take whatever steps it can to
ensure its preservation. Where remediation can be accomplished through mutual agreement, there is little need for
unilateral action-indeed in this instance, unnecessary unilateral restrictions probably amount to disguised protectionism. But where, as so often is the case, consensus on meaningful environmental measures cannot be achieved, the
exercise of market power may be the only effective means to
prevent the irreversible destruction of a species or resource.
6. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (1973).
7. U.N. Doc. UNEP/1G.8013, 28 I.L.M. 6459 (1989).

19951

NAFTA-GATT SYMPOSIUM

1203

COST SHIFTING

This is not to say that developing countries need necessarily absorb alone the incremental costs of protecting the environment. Where a developed industry has enjoyed a free
ride on the environment and thereby gained a competitive advantage over its fledgling counterpart in a developing nation,
cost shifting in the form of subsidies or tariff incentives may
be appropriate. Such issues of remuneration likely are the
proper province for treaty discussions (perhaps in the context
of the World Trade Organization or GATT) because resolution of those issues often can await protracted negotiation.
The fairness argument, however, should be carefully
scrutinized in each circumstance. Returning to the tuna/
dolphin issue, more tuna than ever is being caught using
methods which do not involve encirclement of dolphins at all.
In fact, so much tuna is being caught using dolphin-safe techniques that world tuna prices are severely depressed. There
is, accordingly, no fairness issue in conditioning tuna imports
on dolphin-safe fishing techniques.
On the other hand, the European Community's directives
which would set mandatory levels for the use of recycled
packaging, while laudable, may present difficulties for nations which do not possess a mature recycling industry.
Rather than forfeit the directives under the mantra of free
trade, a cooperative effort could be undertaken involving, for
example, foreign investment in recycling plants and trade
packages. This might enable the directives to be implemented; and to have their intended effect of reducing the destruction of forests and the production of plastics, and at the
same time present business opportunities for companies
within the import and export markets.
WHEN IS TRADE FREE?

Despite the absence of tariffs and other import barriers,
free trade is not really "free" at all if environmental costs are
incurred but not remediated. In these situations, absent an
enforceable treaty obligation which allocates the costs of environmental externalities, the unilateral use of market power
as a counterbalance to free-riding makes economic, and environmental, sense.
Elected officials and their constituents considering the
United States' continued participation in free-trade pacts
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should consider all costs associated with such participation,
and who should bear such costs. In certain circumstances,
cost-shifting from developing to developed economies may be
appropriate. But the negotiation of such multilateral arrangements inevitably is time-consuming. Meanwhile, continued damage may raise remediation costs significantly or
make recovery impossible. In these situations of environmental imperative, in the most literal sense, we cannot afford
to wait. In the meantime, prudent nations (or industries)
which have the ability to do so can and should use their market power to protect the global commons.

